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Abstract 
Many countries exhibit cycles of shortfall 
and overbuilding (bust and boom cycles) 
of their installed generation capacity after 
they restructured their electricity industries 
in the late 1980s. A similar pattern has also 
been observed in New Zealand after its 
electricity industry was restructured in 
1987, including power shortages in 1992, 
2001, 2003 and 2008. Shortages of power 
supply are inconvenient to consumers 
whereas on the other hand, overbuilding 
indicates an inefficient allocation of 
resources. This study proposes a system 
dynamics model to study the problem. 
Advantages of this model over other 
approaches are discussed in this paper. The 
model is customised to incorporate the 
market structure and electricity industry in 
New Zealand, including the development 
phases of constructing a power plant under 
the Resource Management Act (RMA). 
The model is then used to study suitable 
precautionary frameworks that can be used 
to prevent power shortages and aid in 
creating an environment for optimum and 
timely generation expansion in the future. 
Possible future scenarios such as 
penetration of electric cars and adverse 
weather conditions are also included in 
this study. Some preliminary results are 
included and discussed.   
 
Introduction 
In the last few decades, most of the 
developed countries have restructured their 
electricity supply industry with the 
introduction of competitive power markets 
to replace the traditional monopolistic 
vertically integrated systems. The 
restructuring is a very complex exercise 
based on national energy strategies and 
policies, macroeconomic developments  
 
 
and national conditions, and its application 
varies from country to country [1]. 
Reforms that are done without careful 
considerations can be catastrophic and 
damaging like what has happened in 
California, United States. Despite having 
power markets for many years now, 
uncertainties still remain as to whether the 
power market is sufficient to provide 
investments in generation [2-4].  
  
It has been shown in some studies [5-9] 
that deregulation of the electricity industry 
causes boom and bust cycles of generation 
capacity due to reasons such as investment 
uncertainties. Initially power generators 
are uncertain on whether they should build 
a new power plant as that may affect the 
spot price in the power market and hence 
affect their profit returns. Then substantial 
overbuilding occurs because most 
generators compete to build new power 
stations. Monte Carlo simulations suggest 
that for a realistic range of assumptions, 
the deregulated wholesale power markets 
are substantially more cyclical than they 
would have been under a regulated 
monopoly regime[7]. A shortage of power 
supply is not only inconvenient to the 
public but it may harm the economy in the 
long run. Building a power plant needs 
years to plan, design, obtain approval and 
construct; hence a supply shortage may not 
be quickly fixed. On the other hand, 
overbuilding indicates an inefficient 
allocation of resources which defeats the 
purpose of deregulation in the first place. 
This boom and bust trend has been 
observed to happen in the United States [5, 
7] and European countries [8, 9] as shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
 2 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
Ca
pa
cit
y m
arg
in
England & Wales Finland Norway Sweden United States  
Figure 1: Cycles of capacity margin in the US 
and some European countries [9] 
 
Generation capacity in New Zealand  
 
Before the restructuring of the New 
Zealand electricity sector in the 1980s, 
generation planning was the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Energy. The last Energy 
Plan for New Zealand was published in 
1985, and after a less thorough Energy 
Issues Paper in 1986, the publication of 
public planning documents of the kind 
produced since the mid 1950s came to an 
end [10]. After commencement of the 
wholesale electricity market known as the 
New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM) 
in October 1996, the generation expansion 
is supposed to be triggered by a prolonged 
high spot market price indicating the 
reduced margin between electricity supply 
and demand. It is expected that when the 
supply is tight in meeting the demand, the 
spot price would be high enough to 
motivate competing generators to build 
new power plants and gain profit from the 
electricity sales.  
 
Figure 2 shows that the installed 
generation in New Zealand has declined 
for the first time in 1988 before steadily 
picking up again in 2000, despite the 
continuous growth of electricity demand 
within that duration[11]. In May 1992, 
drought causes the South Island hydro 
storage lake levels to become low that 
voluntary savings of 10% of demand were 
called for until the water inflows to the 
South Island lakes began to increase again 
in July.  
 
Figure 2: Installed generation capacity 
in New Zealand from 1974-2008 
 
A similar occurrence happens again from 
July to September 2001, March to June 
2003 and March to July 2008 when low 
lake levels are coupled with high demand 
for electricity. Wholesale electricity spot 
market prices rose sharply as a result. 
During this period the Government 
implemented a conservation campaign 
calling for up to 25% saving in electricity 
usage[12] to maintain continuous 
electricity supply. Even though the winter 
shortages are for only several months in a 
year, they will not have occurred if there is 
sufficient installed capacity available. Dry 
years have happened prior to 1987 even 
when New Zealand had a higher share of 
hydro generation mix, but such winter 
shortages did not occur.  
 
These shortages raise questions as to 
whether the NZEM is sufficient to provide 
incentives for investors to build new 
power plants.  The principles behind the 
NZEM are similar to other markets around 
the world but with some uniqueness[13]: 
1. The generation mix is dominated 
by hydro (around 60%) but its 
storage capacity is relatively small 
compared to some other hydro 
dominated countries.  
2. In some countries, there must be a 
legal separation of generators, 
transmitters, distributors and 
retailers of electricity. However, 
here the main generators are also 
retailers (Gentailers) in the various 
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 3 
distribution areas. This affects the 
way they bid their wholesale 
electricity as high spot wholesale 
prices can harm their retailing 
arms. 
 
This study studies this electricity 
generation expansion issue in New 
Zealand and aims to make projections and 
investigate whether electricity shortages 
will happen in the future.  
 
Research Objectives 
 
In most countries, restructuring has been 
done based on a huge act of faith. As a 
consequence, the strategic and regulatory 
uncertainties are unprecedented. In such a 
market, there has been no historical 
evolution and all the participants including 
the regulatory institutions have very little 
understanding of how it will operate in the 
short term and evolve in the future. In the 
absence of experience and analogies, 
analysis and learning from models assume 
a key role[14].  
 
Dyner and Larsen [15] discuss in details 
how the planning methods in the 
electricity industry changes with the 
introduction of competitive power 
markets. They mention that in a newly 
regulated utility such as electricity, 
uncertainty and risk are high and a 
simulation model would be useful in the 
planning process. One of the models they 
identified is business dynamics or system 
dynamics (SD). SD is a type of 
behavioural simulation model. It is a 
descriptive modelling method based on 
explicit recognition of feedback and time 
lags [16, 17]. It has been developed by 
Prof Jay Forrester of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.  
 
Traditional simulation models have tried to 
include as much detail as possible to make 
the model more precise and thereby 
generate better predictions. SD, on the 
other hand, has increasingly focused on 
understanding the dynamic path into the 
future. The focus has been on learning: 
facilitating a better understanding of how 
the industry (or the system generally) 
evolves over time, understanding which 
variables are critical, and where to 
intervene in the system to create a 
desirable outcome [18].  
 
Where most traditional simulation models 
are built by experts, SD models are 
developed together with the decision 
makers to provide a platform from which 
the team can better understand the 
situation they are facing [17]. Typically, 
SD models include many “soft” variables, 
i.e. variables which are not normally 
captured in traditional simulation models 
or financial models. Examples of these 
might be beliefs about how a regulator 
reacts and beliefs about the behaviour of 
competitors [8, 19, 20]. The model also 
does not confine itself to engineering 
formulae or economic definitions and can 
combine inputs from multidisciplinary 
factors in analysing the data and producing 
results. Where most other methods do not 
work when there is little available data, SD 
can still produce results and provide a 
good understanding of how a regulatory 
framework or policy plays out [14, 18]. 
These unique features of SD make it 
helpful to regulators or policy makers in 
developing relevant policies or regulations. 
An SD model can also be useful for 
countries wishing to embark upon 
deregulation and help develop the suitable 
framework and policy.  
 
SD have been used to study different 
issues in the power industry in some 
countries such as the United States [5-7, 
21-29], United Kingdom [8, 30], Germany 
[31] and Colombia [32]. An evaluation 
paper on the system dynamics model for 
the UK concludes that the model’s 
outcomes indeed occurred in the UK[14].  
  
This study proposes to develop an SD 
model to study the realistic impacts of 
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restructuring on the installed generation 
capacity in New Zealand. Different 
structures, arrangements and competitors’ 
behaviours can be included and studied in 
the model. From the model, it is hoped that 
any severe impacts of restructuring onto 
the generation sector can be avoided by 
putting relevant policies in place.  
 
Preliminary Work 
 
With the research objectives in mind, an 
SD model to study the New Zealand 
generation expansion is developed using 
the software program known as 
Vensim[33]. Some of the questions that 
the research wishes to address are: 
 Will the future generation capacity 
be sufficient to meet the electricity 
energy demands? 
 Will there be other electricity 
energy constraints in future years?   
 
The model begins with modeling the 
development phases of power plants in 
New Zealand starting from the planning to 
the commissioning stage such as that 
shown in Figure 3. It shows the loop for 
hydro plants only but similar loops are 
have also been built for coal, gas, wind, 
geothermal, cogeneration and proposed 
new types of plants like wave and pump 
storage. Each type of plants is given its 
own development loop to capture their 
different phase durations. For example, 
hydro plants can take longer to build 
whereas coal plants can be more difficult 
to approve due to public opposition.  
 
approval time
hydro
commissioning
time hydro
hydro power plants
in planning
hydro power plants
under construction hydro
constructed hydro
power plants
construction time
hydro
proposed hydro
power plants
planning time
hydro
planned hydro
power plants
total planned hydro
power plants
commissioned new
hydro power plants
available hydro
capacity
average plants
availability
installed hydro
capacity
hydro weather
factor  
Figure 3: Construction loop example for hydro 
plants 
 
The output of the development phase 
provides the installed capacity (in MW) 
for the type of plants concerned. However, 
it is not possible to have all plants 
available throughout a year. Therefore the 
average plants availability factor is 
included to calculate the available annual 
energy capacity (in GWh) for each type of 
plants. The energy capacity is of interest in 
this model because New Zealand is usually 
energy constrained rather than peak 
demand constrained. The average plants 
availability factor values are deduced from 
the Electricity Commission’s (EC) records 
of power plants as of May 2008[34].  
 
For hydro, pumped storage and wind 
power plants, the variable ‘weather factor’ 
is included to capture weather variabilities 
that determine the plant output. This 
allows the model to include the impact of 
dry years and calm wind. The phase 
durations and other model parameters are 
set as shown in Table 1.  
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Planning 
duration 
(year) 
Approval 
time (year) 
Construct-
ion duration 
(year) 
Commission-
ing duration 
(year) 
Average 
plant 
availability 
factor 
Weather 
factor 
Plant 
type 
Plant 
lead 
time 
(year) 
Base Range Base Range Base Range Base Range Base Range Base Range 
Hydro 5 1 1-3 1 0.5-2 3 3-5 0.25 0.1-1 0.5
5 
0.4-
0.8 
1 0.5-1 
Coal  4 1 0.5-2 1 0.5-2 2 1-3 0.25 0.1-1 0.9 0.85-
0.95 
N/
A 
N/A 
Combin-
ed cycle 
gas 
turbine 
(CCGT) 
3 0.5 0.5-2 0.5 0.5-2 2 1-3 0.25 0.1-1 0.9 0.85-
0.95 
N/
A 
N/A 
Open 
Cycle 
Gas 
Turbine 
(OCGT) 
2 0.5 0.5-2 0.5 0.5-2 1 1-3 0.25 0.1-1 0.9 0.85-
0.95 
N/
A 
N/A 
Wind 
 
3 1 1-3 1 0.5-2 1 1-3 0.25 0.1-1 0.3 0.15-
0.5 
1 0.5-1 
Geother-
mal 
3 1 1-3 1 0.5-2 1 1-3 0.25 0.1-1 0.8 0.5-
0.9 
N/
A 
N/A 
Cogenera
-tion 
(Cogen) 
3 1 1-3 1 0.5-2 1 1-2 0.25 0.1-1 0.9 0.85-
0.95 
N/
A 
N/A 
Pumped 
storage 
7 1 1-3 2 1-3 5 3-7 0.25 0.1-1 0.8 0.7-
0.9 
1 0.5-1 
Wave 5 1.5 1-3 1.5 1-3 2 1-3 0.25 0.1-1 0.8 0.7-
0.9 
N/
A 
N/A 
Table 1: Model parameters for the development loop for each type of plants 
 
The base values are the typical values that 
are used for simulations whereas the range 
shows how the parameters and durations 
are varied to study the impacts of different 
possible factors.  
 
An important development phase is the 
approval phase which involves the 
Resource Management Act that determines 
whether the power plants get built or not. 
This phase may also incur additional 
delays and costs to the project which can 
deter the willingness of the investors to 
continue with the project. If the project is 
not pursued, then the project does not 
proceed to the next construction phase in 
the loop. The power plants development 
schedules are done in accordance with the 
2008 Statement of Opportunities[35], 
(SOO2008), prepared by the EC. At this 
stage of the research, it is assumed that all  
 
of the plants proposed by the EC will 
proceed into construction and 
commissioning.  
 
The outputs of the development phases are 
then summed to provide the annual 
available generation capacity in New 
Zealand, as shown in Figure 4. The outputs 
from the development loops are shown as 
shadow variables in the software. The total 
available generation capacity in the model 
also includes the plants which are 
scheduled to be decommissioned and 
demand side response, as included in the 
SOO2008.  
 
The simulation is run from 2008 to 2036, 
similar duration as the models in 
SOO2008. To study whether the available 
generation capacity is sufficient to meet 
the forecasted demand, the energy capacity 
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margin, ECM, is calculated. It is defined 
as the ratio of available energy surplus 
over the demand:  
 
Energy capacity margin, ECM = 
(Available generation capacity – electricity 
energy demand)/ Electricity energy 
demand 
 
A positive margin means that the available 
capacity is sufficient to meet the projected 
demand. The factors included in the model 
that can affect the energy capacity margin 
values are:  
• Demand consumption  
• Delays in developing new 
generation capacities 
• Plants availability factors 
• Weather factors 
 
energy capacity
margin
decommissioned
power plants
forecasted demand
load curtailment or
interruptible load
<available
geothermal capacity>
<available hydro
capacity>
<available ocgt
capacity> <available wind
capacity>
<available ccgt
capacity>
available generation
capacity
<available coal
capacity>
<available cogen
capacity>
<available wave
capacity><available pumped
storage capacity>
 
Figure 4: The outputs in the New Zealand 
generation expansion model 
 
The SOO2008 has outlined five different 
future scenarios and developed the 
corresponding power plant schedules. This 
study explores each scenario and uses each 
schedule to test whether the resulting 
available capacity will meet their 
forecasted demands. The ECM is observed 
to see whether any serious shortage will 
occur in New Zealand. A summary of the 
preliminary simulations results under the 
Sustainable Path scenario is included here. 
The Sustainable Path scenario is defined 
as: “New Zealand embarks on a path of 
sustainable electricity development and 
sector emissions reduction. Major existing 
thermal power stations close down and are 
replaced by renewable generation, 
including hydro, wind and geothermal 
backed by thermal peakers for security of 
supply. Electric vehicle uptake is relatively 
rapid after 2020. New energy sources are 
brought on stream in the late 2020s and 
2030s, including biomass, marine, and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
Demand-side response helps to manage 
peak demand”[35]. 
 
For the SOO2008, the EC has forecasted 
the national energy demand projections 
from 2007 till 2036. From the forecast, 
high and low demand projections are 
obtained using an 80% confidence limit. 
Figure 5 shows the simulated ECM under 
the different load projections using the 
base values of the model parameters. In all 
cases, it is observed that the energy 
capacity margins remain positive for all 
demand projections. There is also a 
possibility of over-investments from 2024 
onwards. The ECMs are highest when the 
demand is lowest.  
 
Figure 5: The ECM under different demand 
projections 
 
To study some worst case scenarios for 
different factors, the high demand 
projection is used in the following 
analyses. Figure 6 shows the impact of 
development delays on the ECM. The 
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delays cause the power plants to become 
available later and hence lowering the 
energy capacity margins in the early years 
of simulation. However, the ECM still 
remains positive indicating no serious 
shortage is expected in the given situation.  
 
 
Figure 6: The impact of development delays on 
the ECM   
 
Figure 7 shows the impact of low plants 
availability on the ECM. The ECM drops 
to low and negative values from year 2016 
to 2027, indicating potential shortages 
within those years . 
 
 
Figure 7: The impact of low plant availability on 
the ECM 
 
Figure 8 shows the impact of worst 
weather conditions on the ECM, resulting 
in some negative ECM values from 2012 
to 2028. This indicates that weather 
conditions may cause shortages within 
those years. 
 
 
Figure 8: The impact of worst weather 
conditions on the ECM 
 
These preliminary results show that the 
basic model is working as theory suggests. 
To provide a more realistic forecast for the 
generation expansion, the next stage of this 
research includes the NZEM operations in 
triggering the investments suggested by 
the SOO2008.   Figure 9 shows how the 
market structure can be incorporated in the 
model by introducing a loop in the 
previous model structure shown in Figure 
4.  
energy capacity
margin
decommissioned
power plants
forecasted demand
load curtailment or
interruptible load
<available
geothermal capacity>
<available hydro
capacity>
<available ocgt
capacity> <available wind
capacity>
<available ccgt
capacity>
available generation
capacity
<available coal
capacity>
<available cogen
capacity>
<available wave
capacity><available pumped
storage capacity>
spot market price
new investment
investors decisions
 
Figure 9: The incorporation of the market 
structure in the model 
 
This incorporation demonstrates the 
unique ability of an SD model in analysing 
the dynamic interaction between the 
generation capacity and demand with the 
spot market price. The price then 
influences the decision on whether a new 
generation capacity is required. Once a 
new capacity comes on line, the spot 
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market price will then be affected and this 
will influence the investment decision of 
other new generation investments. 
 
Investors will only proceed with the 
development of new power plants when 
they deem the investments to be profitable. 
Different competitors’ behaviours will be 
taken into account, including the natural 
hedge behaviours by gentailers and how 
they decide in starting a new generation 
investment.  Some projects may also face 
delays in approval, causing investors to 
cancel if the market conditions change 
within the approval duration. Hence, not 
all suggested projects will proceed onto 
construction. 
 
Once the market structure is incorporated, 
all five scenarios listed in SOO2008 will 
be simulated under different model 
parameters to investigate any possible 
shortages. It will also be observed whether 
a boom occurs where there are over-
investments in building new generation 
capacity. 
 
Conclusion 
The electricity market approach that 
replaced conventional central planning for 
generation expansion has introduced 
several uncertainties in terms of providing 
the correct stimulus for new investments. 
Boom and bust cycles have been observed 
in other countries around the world which 
have adopted the approach. The 
development of an SD model for New 
Zealand will provide the ability to check 
whether a similar occurrence happens 
here. Energy shortages can also be 
forecasted and preventive measures can 
then be taken.  
 
References 
 
1. Lai, L.L., Power system 
restructuring and deregulation : 
trading, performance and 
information technology. 2001, 
Chichester, England ; New York: 
John Wiley. xxix, 468 p. 
2. Bidwell, M. and A. Henney, Will 
the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements Ensure Generation 
Adequacy? The Electricity Journal, 
2004. 17(7): p. 15-38. 
3. Keller, K. and J. Wild, Long-term 
investment in electricity: a trade-
off between co-ordination and 
competition? Utilities Policy, 2004. 
12(4): p. 243-251. 
4. Neuhoff, K. and L. De Vries, 
Insufficient incentives for 
investment in electricity 
generations. Utilities Policy, 2004. 
12(4): p. 253-267. 
5. Ford, A., Cycles in competitive 
electricity markets: a simulation 
study of the western United States. 
Energy Policy, 1999. 27(11): p. 
637-658. 
6. Ford, A., Waiting for the boom: : a 
simulation study of power plant 
construction in California. Energy 
Policy, 2001. 29(11): p. 847-869. 
7. Kadoya, T., et al., Utilizing System 
Dynamics Modeling to Examine 
Impact of Deregulation on 
Generation Capacity Growth. 
Proceedings of the IEEE, 2005. 
93(11): p. 2060-2069. 
8. Bunn, D.W. and E.R. Larsen, 
Sensitivity of reserve margin to 
factors influencing investment 
behaviour in the electricity market 
of England and Wales. Energy 
Policy, 1992. 20(5): p. 420-429. 
9. Lévêque, F., Competitive 
electricity markets and 
sustainability. 2006, Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar. xv, 302 p. 
10. Mohamed, Z., Forecasting 
Electricity Consumption: A 
Comparison of Growth Curves, 
Econometric and ARIMA Models 
for Selected Countries and World 
Regions, in Electrical and 
Electronic Engineering. 2004, 
 9 
University of Canterbury: 
Christchurch. p. 375. 
11. Ministry of Economic 
Development New Zealand, New 
Zealand Energy Data File 2009. 
2009. 
12. Electricity Group ( Energy & 
Communications Branch), 
Chronology of New Zealand 
Electricity Reform, Ministry of 
Economic Development New 
Zealand, Editor. 2009. 
13. Genesis Energy, Electricity 
Trading in the New Zealand 
Electricity Market. 2010. 
14. Larsen, E.R. and D.W. Bunn, 
Deregulation in Electricity: 
Understanding Strategic and 
Regulatory Risk. The Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 
1999. 50(4): p. 337-344. 
15. Dyner, I. and E.R. Larsen, From 
planning to strategy in the 
electricity industry. Energy Policy, 
2001. 29(13): p. 1145-1154. 
16. Forrester, J.W., Industrial 
dynamics. 1961, [Cambridge, 
Mass.]: M.I.T. Press. 464 p. 
17. Sterman, J., Business dynamics : 
systems thinking and modeling for 
a complex world. 2000, Boston: 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill. xxvi, 982 p. 
18. Lomi, A. and E. Larsen, Learning 
without experience: strategic 
implications of deregulation and 
competition in the electricity 
industry. European Management 
Journal, 1999. 17(2): p. 151-163. 
19. Bunn, D.W., I. Dyner, and E.R. 
Larsen, Modelling latent market 
power across gas and electricity 
markets. System Dynamics 
Review, 1997. 13(4): p. 271-288. 
20. Dyner, I., Energy Modelling 
Platforms for Policy and Strategy 
Support. The Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 
2000. 51(2): p. 136-144. 
21. Ford, A. and A. Youngblood, 
Simulating the spiral of 
impossibility in the electric utility 
industry. Energy Policy, 1983. 
11(1): p. 19-38. 
22. Ford, A., K. Vogstad, and H. 
Flynn, Simulating price patterns 
for tradable green certificates to 
promote electricity generation from 
wind. Energy Policy, 2007. 35(1): 
p. 91-111. 
23. Ford, A. and J. Geinzer, Adding 
uncertainty to least-cost planning : 
A case study of efficiency standards 
in the Northwest. Energy Policy, 
1990. 18(4): p. 331-339. 
24. Ford, A., M. Bull, and R.F. Naill, 
Bonneville's conservation policy 
analysis models. Energy Policy, 
1987. 15(2): p. 109-124. 
25. Ford, A. and M. Bull, Using system 
dynamics for conservation policy 
analysis in the Pacific Northwest. 
System Dynamics Review, 1989. 
5(1): p. 1-16. 
26. Ford, A., Simulation scenarios for 
rapid reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions in the western electricity 
system. Energy Policy, 2008. 36(1): 
p. 443-455. 
27. Ford, A., System Dynamics and the 
Electric Power Industry. System 
Dynamics Review, 1997. 13(1): p. 
57-85. 
28. Ford, A., The impacts of large 
scale use of electric vehicles in 
southern California. Energy and 
Buildings, 1995. 22(3): p. 207-218. 
29. Ford, A., Electric vehicles and the 
electric utility company. Energy 
Policy, 1994. 22(7): p. 555-570. 
30. Gary, S. and E.R. Larsen, 
Improving firm performance in 
out-of-equilibrium, deregulated 
markets using feedback simulation 
models. Energy Policy, 2000. 
28(12): p. 845-855. 
31. Jaeger, T., S. Schmidt, and U. Karl. 
A system dynamics model for the 
German electricity market - model 
development and application. in 
The 27th International Conference 
 10 
of the System Dynamics Society. 
2009. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
USA System Dynamics Society. 
32. Arango, S., et al. System Dynamic 
Model to Analyse Investments in 
Power Generation in Colombia. in 
20th System Dynamics Conference. 
2002. Palermo, Italy: System 
Dynamics Society. 
33. Ventana Systems. Vensim.  2010  
[cited 2010 8 April 2010]; 
Available from: 
http://www.vensim.com/. 
34. Electricity Commission, 
Generating Station List May 2008. 
2008. 
35. Electricity Commission, 2008 
Statement of Opportunities. 2008. 
 
 
